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Financial developments in Spain
From the beginning of 2009, financial developments in the Spanish economy were influenced 
by a gradual improvement in financial markets and by the effects of accommodative eco-
nomic policies and a recessionary macroeconomic environment. During the course of the year, 
the ECB began to withdraw some of its exceptional monetary policy measures (see Chapter 
4), the severity of the recession progressively eased and a necessary fiscal consolidation proc-
ess was initiated (see Chapter 5). In the first few months of 2010, the normalisation of markets 
was interrupted by the public finance problems in Greece, which eventually led to a serious 
fiscal crisis in the Greek economy (see Chapter 4). Those countries that had suffered the larg-
est deteriorations in their public finances and that had the poorest growth prospects were 
worst affected by the strains.
After following a downward trend from late 2008, the financing costs of households and firms 
are currently at low levels (see Chart 6.1). These developments have reflected the decline in 
interbank yields, albeit with some lag and incompletely, with larger increases in the premiums 
required in the higher risk segments (financing for consumption and SMEs). By contrast, ac-
cording to the results of the Bank Lending Survey, credit conditions other than interest rates 
remained very restrictive; after tightening severely they have only very recently (2010 Q1) be-
gun to show the first signs of easing.
The growth rate of the indebtedness of the non-financial private sector has slowed continu-
ously from its cyclical peak in 2006, falling from over 20% into negative territory. However, 
while corporate debt has continued to contract, household debt seems to have stabilised in 
recent months (see Chart 6.1). As argued in greater detail in Chapter 1, this was the result of 
a wide range of factors. The gradual adjustment that had started before the crisis, owing to the 
change in the monetary policy cycle against a background of high household and corporate 
debt ratios and an oversized real estate sector, was exacerbated by the international crisis it-
self, which led to strong contractionary pressures on both demand and supply. Loan applica-
tions thus showed some moderation —as a result of the deterioration in confidence and high 
uncertainty— against a background of sluggish economic activity and large rises in unemploy-
ment, while the high level of private sector debt, along with the poor macroeconomic outlook, 
has led credit institutions to consider a larger proportion of such applications unprofitable.
In the case of firms, their poor results were reflected in a decline in their profitability indicators 
and a rise in their debt ratios, despite the contraction in the volume of their debt. However, 
their debt burden was significantly reduced as a result of the decline in financing costs.
The decline in the debt burden has not prevented doubtful assets ratios from continuing to 
rise, which put pressure on credit institutions’ income statements
Despite the decline in the private sector’s debt burden, some segments of the sector are cur-
rently experiencing a higher degree of financial pressure, reflected in rises in the doubtful as-
sets ratio. Although the latter is rising less sharply in recent months, it still does not appear to 
have reached its cyclical peak (see Chart 6.1).
This increase in the doubtful assets ratio is having negative effects on the results of Spanish 
financial intermediaries, reducing their capacity to respond to further deterioration in their as-
1 Introduction
Financial developments were 
influenced by accommodative 
economic policies, a 
recessionary environment and a 
gradual improvement in 
international financial markets, 
which was interrupted in the 
first few months of 2010
Private-sector financing costs 
have reached low levels, 
although there have been no 
signs of any easing in other 
credit conditions until very 
recently
Despite the sharp slowdown in 
lending to the private sector, 
which reached negative annual 
growth rates and was mainly a 
result of cyclical factors, ...
... there were no substantial 
reductions in household and 
corporate debt ratios owing to 
sluggish household and 
corporate income
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 142 ANNUAL REPORT, 2009 6. FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENTS IN SPAIN   
sets. The financial system as a whole remains sound, although the position of individual finan-
cial institutions varies, both in terms of their exposure to impaired assets and in terms of their 
capacity to make the necessary provisions. This, along with the fact that the sector is too 
large, as the crisis has shown, highlights the need for institutions – especially those that pur-
sued more risky strategies during the boom – to restructure.
In addition to the measures taken in 2008, which provided exceptional mechanisms to allevi-
ate the difficulties institutions were having obtaining wholesale financing, through the Fund for 
the Acquisition of Financial Assets and the granting of government guarantees, a strategy was 
implemented in 2009 to promote an orderly restructuring of those institutions potentially most 
affected by the crisis, by means of the creation of the Fund for the Orderly Restructuring of the 
Exceptional mechanisms have 
been set up to mitigate financial 
strains and promote an orderly 
restructuring of the financial 
sector
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SOURCES: ECB and Banco de España. 
 
a. Calculated as a weighted average of the interest rates of various operations grouped according to 
their volume. For loans over €1 million, the interest rate is obtained by adding to the NDER (narrowly 
defined effective rate), which does not include commission and other expenses, a moving average 
of these expenses. 
b. Cumulative changes in the diffusion index so a positive sign denotes tightening. 
c. Year-on-year rates. 
d. Calculated as doubtful credit/total credit.
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Banking Sector (FROB). The provisions of the FROB began to be activated in Spring 2010 with 
the approval of some processes for the restructuring and merger of savings banks (see Box 
6.1).
In any case, market recovery and the use of government guarantees for securities issuance 
enabled institutions to raise a positive net amount of funds on the primary securities markets 
once again. This helped to boost activity in these markets, although the latter was primarily 
determined by the behaviour of general government.
The fall in tax revenues, automatic stabilisers and the fiscal stimulus packages designed to 
offset the contraction in private spending have led to a deterioration of public finances and a 
significant increase in public debt. This, along with the decline in GDP, has led to a rapid in-
crease in the debt-to-GDP ratio and in the interest burden.
The rise in the general government deficit has partly offset the increase in household net lend-
ing and the reduction in corporate net borrowing. Even so, there has been a significant decline 
in the nation’s net borrowing.
The consequences of rapid growth in general government debt and in the general government 
debt burden are being exacerbated by the heightened sensitivity of markets to the state of 
public finances, as shown recently by the strains that arose as a consequence of the Greek 
fiscal crisis. In this situation, the adoption of an ambitious and credible budget consolidation 
strategy is essential to avoid the risks to the long-term sustainability of public finances.
The decline in financing costs has alleviated the private sector’s debt burden. However, the 
recessionary environment is contributing to an increase in the financial pressure on certain 
segments of this sector. Along with the high level of household and corporate debt and the 
need to restructure the financial system, this will tend to curb the recovery in financing. The 
latter will start sooner and on a firmer footing the faster and more orderly the rebuilding of 
household and corporate balance sheets and the restructuring of banks.
The Spanish securities markets have progressively stabilised since March 2009, reflecting the 
improvement in agents’ expectations, albeit with certain episodes of instability, the one associ-
ated with the Greek public finance crisis in the first few months of 2010 having been espe-
cially intense. In the primary markets there has been significant growth in activity, mainly as a 
result of the expansionary behaviour of general government.
The net issuance of bonds by resident sectors totalled €193 bn, up from €131 bn in 2008 (see 
Chart 6.1). Around two thirds of this amount corresponded to general government operations, 
reflecting the higher net borrowing of this sector. By type of instrument, medium and long-term 
debt continued to be the main means of raising funds. However, the significant growth in 
Treasury bill issuance led to a slight reduction in the average life of public debt, to 6.4 years 
(from 6.6 at the end of 2008).
Monetary financial institutions issued, directly or through resident and non-resident subsidiar-
ies, around €27 bn. This was assisted by the improvement in the markets, by the granting of 
government guarantees for the bond issues of credit institutions – the amounts guaranteed 
totalling, in gross terms, €48 bn – and by the ECB’s covered bond purchase programme (see 
Chapter 4) – almost €30 bn of covered bonds were issued in net terms –. Issuance by non-
monetary financial institutions fell significantly as a consequence of the decline in securitisa-
tion activity, against a background in which, although asset-backed securities had continued 
The strong fiscal expansion has 
led to a significant increase in 
public debt ...
... partly offsetting the 
significant decline in private 
sector net borrowing
Fiscal consolidation is essential 
to ensure the sustainability of 
public debt
The process of household and 
corporate deleveraging and 
financial system restructuring 
are essential if the recovery in 
lending is not to be hindered
2 The Spanish financial 
markets
2.1 THE PRIMARY MARKETS
The net issuance of marketable 
securities has recovered 
somewhat since March 2009, 
primarily driven by general 
government activity ...
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The financial turmoil which broke out during summer 2007 prompt-
ed a sudden fall in the value of a wide range of financial instruments 
and a drastic contraction in liquidity in many international markets, 
which caused some of them to actually freeze up. Globally, this first 
phase of the crisis was therefore financial and, in those countries 
caught up in it, the institutions most affected were those with great-
er exposure to so-called “toxic assets” or with larger short-term refi-
nancing needs.
As the financial crisis progressed a negative feedback loop devel-
oped between the financial sector and the real economy, which led to 
a severe global recession. This second phase of the crisis, in which 
macroeconomic aspects have been combined with the purely finan-
cial ones, has had a greater effect on the banking sector’s traditional 
business in a number of economies, chiefly as a result of the deterio-
ration in credit portfolios. This explains why its impact on income 
statements has been more gradual, since loan defaults take longer to 
materialise than losses in a portfolio of financial instruments.
Furthermore, the resultant rapid repricing of risk meant financial and 
non-financial agents’ debt levels were perceived as excessively high 
and triggered widespread deleveraging worldwide.
The impact of all these developments on banking systems has 
highlighted sizeable divergences between countries and, even in 
the same country, not all institutions have been affected to the 
BOX 6.1MEASURES TO SUPPORT SPANISH CREDIT INSTITUTIONS IN THE CONTEXT OF THE INTERNATIONAL 
FINANCIAL CRISIS
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SOURCES:  FDIC Quarterly Income Profile Spreadsheets, ECB and Banco de España. 
 
a. The 2009 figure is for the first six months. 
b. United States: includes TARP capital injections and the recapitalisation of the mortgage securitisation agencies. United Kingdom: includes 
the recapitalisation of Royal Bank of Scotland and Lloyds-HBOS, and financing from the Deposit Guarantee Fund received by institutions 
subject to supervisory intervention. Spain: includes the announced subscription of preference shares by the Fund for the Orderly 
Restructuring of the Banking Sector as part of the savings bank merger and consolidation plans approved in March, and which is pending 
disbursement. 
c. United States: includes the Temporary Liquidity Guarantee Program and the Asset Guarantee Program. United Kingdom: includes the 
Credit Guarantee Scheme and the Asset Protection Scheme. In the case of the euro area, the collateral and guarantees include both 
collateral for debt issued by financial institutions and guarantees for assets on the balance sheets of banks and their subsidiaries. 
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 145 ANNUAL REPORT, 2009 6. FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENTS IN SPAIN
MEASURES TO SUPPORT SPANISH CREDIT INSTITUTIONS IN THE CONTEXT OF THE INTERNATIONAL 
FINANCIAL CRISIS (cont´d)
BOX 6.1
same extent. This heterogeneity can be explained by a number of 
factors, such as differences in business models or in the buffers 
available for absorbing shocks, and has led to governments 
adopting differing response strategies and financial support 
measures.
In the case of the Spanish economy, the markedly retail-oriented 
banking model meant the presence of toxic assets in banks’ portfo-
lios had been kept to a minimum, while more stringent regulation had 
prevented the creation of off-balance sheet investment vehicles. 
Consequently, the impact of the first phase of the financial crisis in 
Spain was very limited (see Panel 1). Moreover, banks’ high provi-
sioning and earnings levels made for strong lines of defence. The 
funding difficulties in the wholesale markets had a considerable im-
pact, but they were overcome thanks to a financing structure with a 
large weight of long-term liabilities, to an increase in deposit-taking 
made possible by extensive branch networks and to the issuance of 
short-term securities, a segment that had been affected less severely 
by the turmoil.
By contrast, the first phase of the financial crisis severely affected the 
profitability of banks in other developed countries, among them the 
United States, the United Kingdom and some euro area countries 
(see Panel 1), in many cases resulting in substantial losses due to 
high exposure to the most affected assets.
A wide range of extraordinary measures were duly implemented. 
During the last few months of 2008, the governments of the United 
Kingdom, the United States and several euro area countries made 
injections of public capital into a number of banks and set up pro-
grammes to guarantee debt securities issued by banks. In some 
cases, they also started developing plans to purchase or protect 
impaired assets (see Panels 2 and 3). Meanwhile, in October 2008 
the Spanish government adopted a series of measures as part of 
concerted action with the other euro area countries, although their 
use was more limited than in the other cases mentioned above, 
given the lesser impact of the first phase of the crisis on the Span-
ish banking system.1 Out of this came the creation of a fund for the 
acquisition of financial assets (FAFA) of high quality – a notable dif-
ference compared with funds in other countries –, which was de-
ployed by means of tender operations involving potentially inter-
ested institutions; an agreement to provide government guaran-
tees for debt issued by banks, although they were not used until 
January 2009; and authorisation for the government acquisition of 
securities to bolster institutions’ own resources, which was never 
used (however, the management of a small institution whose sol-
vency had deteriorated considerably was taken over).
The second phase of the crisis, nonetheless, has affected the 
Spanish banking system to a greater extent. In particular, the rapid 
rise in unemployment and the large weight of the real estate sector 
in the Spanish economy contributed to a surge in doubtful assets, 
putting more pressure on institutions’ income statements. Although 
the buffers in place – as a result of the regulation on countercyclical 
provisioning requirements – have helped cushion the impact, the 
progressive worsening of the macroeconomic situation has sub-
stantially reduced their size. Moreover, the effects vary within the 
sector, as demonstrated by the sizeable differences between insti-
tutions’ doubtful assets ratios and in their capacity to generate 
earnings (see Panel 4). Under these circumstances it became nec-
essary to adopt a strategy to prompt and support an orderly re-
structuring of the sector to pave the way for its downsizing, given 
the prospect of a lower degree of leverage in the private sector in 
the future, and to boost its robustness to ensure that institutions 
would be capable of providing the necessary funding as the econ-
omy recovered.
In this context, the creation of the Fund for the Orderly Restructuring 
of the Banking Sector (FROB) was approved in June 2009 as an in-
strument designed to help see through the necessary adjustment in 
the banking sector. Its design took into account the particularities of 
the Spanish financial system – such as the existence of savings 
banks, with their unique governance structure – and benefited from 
the considerable supervisory experience and advantages of the tried 
and tested institutional model in place, which was adapted to the 
new situation.
The operational framework of the FROB allows different courses of 
action to be followed depending on the specific situation of the insti-
tution in question. It supports two kinds of process: the restructuring 
of institutions with weaknesses that may affect their future viability, 
and the consolidation of institutions, with the aim of improving their 
efficiency in the medium term. The first type involves a staggered ap-
proach, whereby an institution submits a viability plan to the Banco 
de España, which may include different measures (a strengthening of 
the capital base and capital adequacy, consolidation with other insti-
tutions, or a total or partial transfer of business), for which it can re-
quest financial assistance. If this approach is unsuccessful, control is 
taken of the bank and the FROB is appointed as provisional adminis-
trator. A restructuring plan then has to be devised with the aim of ar-
ranging the institution’s merger or acquisition, or the total or partial 
transfer of its assets and liabilities.
In the case of consolidation, institutions are required to submit a 
plan showing efficiency improvements and a restructuring of their 
capacity. The FROB may temporarily acquire preference shares 
convertible to ordinary shares, non-voting equity units or share 
capital contributions. To date, the Banco de España has approved 
three consolidation plans submitted by savings banks which, to-
gether, have involved the FROB subscribing for preference shares 
convertible to non-voting equity units in the resulting institutions 
with a total value of €2,155 million,2 and has replaced the directors 
of one institution.
1. For a more detailed review of the measures introduced by financial authori-
ties, see the Financial Stability Report and the Report on Banking Supervision 
in Spain.
2. The Fund for the Orderly Restructuring of the Banking Sector has an initial 
provision of €9 billion and can raise ten times this amount in external funding 
subject to the authorisation of the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Fi-
nance.
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BOX 6.1MEASURES TO SUPPORT SPANISH CREDIT INSTITUTIONS IN THE CONTEXT OF THE INTERNATIONAL 
FINANCIAL CRISIS (cont´d)
This approach has considerable advantages. First, it allows the adop-
tion of different solutions, depending on institutions’ needs and, more 
particularly, it permits different treatment of those institutions that are 
viable, which receive support tailored to their circumstances, and 
those that are not, which are placed under official administration. 
Second, the FROB is structured in such a way that it prioritises pre-
ventive action, whereby the initiative stems from the institutions them-
selves and they retain responsibility for risk management.
In short, the different channel through which the financial crisis af-
fected the Spanish banking system (a deterioration of credit portfo-
lios associated with the unique characteristics of the Spanish eco-
nomic crisis rather than the fall in value of financial instruments) and 
different timing (later and more gradual) compared with other devel-
oped countries explains the distinct design of the government sup-
port to the financial system in Spain. The FROB can thus contribute 
to the necessary restructuring of the system, if it is used with greater 
purpose, to address in a speedily and orderly manner the challenges 
the system faces. In the first instance, institutions have to take the 
initiative, but recourse to the fund will prepare them to perform their 
intermediation function efficiently once the economy embarks on a 
path of recovery.
to be issued after the start of the crisis, these had been purchased by the originator institu-
tions. The net issuance of bonds by non-financial corporations – basically through resident 
subsidiaries – exceeded €18 bn, which accounted for around one third of the outstanding 
amount of these instruments and was in marked contrast to the €6 bn issued on average in 
the period 2006-08.
Issuance of new equity securities totalled €10 bn, which implied a less sharp reduction than in 
2008. This was the result of a decline in issues by financial institutions and growth in those of 
non-financial corporations. Since the second half of 2009, against a background of market 
recovery, there have been four public offerings, by companies newly listed on the Spanish Al-
ternative Stock Market, although their total amount was small (€0.2 bn).
Activity in the secondary markets in 2009, as in 2008, varied significantly across segments 
(see Table 6.2). In the AIAF fixed-income market, the volume traded reached almost €3,700 
bn, which implies year-on-year growth of 54%, covered bonds and asset-backed bonds be-
ing the instruments that grew most. As in 2008, sell/buy-back agreements with the Treasury 
or Banco de España (Eurosystem loans to Spanish credit institutions) as counterparts were 
prominent.
By contrast, trading on the public debt market decreased by 7%, mainly as a result of the 
9% fall in repo and sell/buy-back transactions, which more than offset the 12% increase in 
spot transactions. Stock market trading of private fixed income and equities also recorded 
falls, of 6% and 28% respectively, which in the latter case reflects declines in both the 
number of transactions and in the average prices. Likewise, the volume of derivatives trad-
ing decreased by 34%, primarily as a consequence of the decline in contracts on the IBEX 
35 index.
By March 2009 the IBEX 35 index had fallen by more than 57% from its peak in November 
2007, in line with the EURO STOXX 50 index of euro area stock markets and the S&P 500 index 
of US markets (see Chart 6.2). Thereafter stock markets gradually recovered, while volatility 
declined. By the end of the year volatility had reached similar levels to those of the months 
preceding the intensification of the international financial crisis in autumn 2008. However, these 
trends were interrupted by the Greek fiscal crisis in the first few months of 2010, a period in 
which the Spanish index recorded larger falls than the euro area benchmark index.
2.2 SECONDARY MARKET 
ACTIVITY
... while trading on the 
secondary markets varied 
notably across segments
2.3 SECONDARY MARKET 
PRICES
Stock markets recovered and 
their volatility declined, although 
both these trends were 
interrupted at the beginning of 
2010 by the Greek fiscal crisis
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Following the decreases in the second half of 2008, public debt yields have fluctuated within 
a narrower range, while remaining at historically low levels, especially in the case of short-term 
instruments. From 2009 Q2 the yield on Treasury bills stood below 1%, while from the end of 
2008 that on 10-year bonds stood at around 4%. After peaking in February 2009, the spread 
between this yield and that of the German 10-year bund tended to decline. However this trend 
was interrupted in the first few months of 2010 by the strains arising from the Greek fiscal 
crisis, which have been reflected in an increase in this indicator and in high volatility. In this 
period the spread reached higher levels than those recorded in early 2009.
The credit default swap (CDS) spreads of financial firms and, especially, non-financial firms fell 
very steeply from the highs reached at the end of 2008, to stand at the levels prevailing prior 
to the intensification of the crisis in the autumn of that year. The financial market instability in 
the first few months of 2010 caused CDS spreads, like public debt yields, to rise, especially in 
the case of financial securities, which were partly affected by their exposure to sovereign 
risks.
Spanish credit institutions were hardly affected by the initial stages of the international financial 
crisis, owing to their retail banking model, the absence of toxic assets and off-balance sheat 
investment vehicles, and the Spanish system of countercylical provisioning. In addition, they 
were initially able to avoid the difficulties in the wholesale financing markets owing to the struc-
ture of their liabilities, which are concentrated at the longer maturities, an increase in their de-
posits, which was assisted by their extensive branch networks, and greater issuance of com-
mercial paper. However, subsequently the macroeconomic environment has been particularly 
weak in Spain owing to the sharp rise in unemployment and the adjustment in the real estate 
sector. These factors are increasing doubtful assets and putting pressure on credit institutions’ 
income statements, especially in the case of those intermediaries that assumed greater risks 
during the expansionary phase.
3 Spanish financial 
intermediaries
3.1 CREDIT INSTITUTIONS
Credit institutions are being 
severely affected by the 
recessionary environment
2006 2007 2008 2009
NET ISSUANCE BY RESIDENTS 231.6 268.3 145.9 203.1
FIXED INCOME 223.9 222.4 131.1 192.9
Monetary financial institutions 97.2 78.2 -26.9 39.5
Other financial intermediaries 128.5 146.5 104.6 24.9
Of which:
Financial vehicle corporations 69.7 106.9 94.4 14.9
Subsidiaries of monetary financial institutions 39.4 42.6 21.0 -9.1
Subsidiaries of non-financial corporations 10.9 5.7 1.6 16.0
Non-financial corporations 1.0 2.0 1.9 0.7
Central government -4.8 -4.7 50.2 119.4
Regional and local government 2.1 0.4 1.4 8.4
EQUITIES 7.8 46.0 14.8 10.2
Monetary financial institutions 3.0 12.0 10.0 3.0
Other financial intermediaries 0.1 3.5 1.4 0.4
Non-financial corporations 4.6 30.5 3.4 6.8
PUBLIC OFFERINGS 2.5 2.1 0.0 0.2
MEMORANDUM ITEMS
Net issuance by foreign subsidiaries -8.5 9.5 12.9 -2.0
Financial institutions -2.6 8.2 14.3 -3.4
Non-financial corporations -6.0 1.3 -1.4 1.5
ISSUANCE AND PUBLIC OFFERINGS OF MARKETABLE SECURITIES TABLE 6.1 
SOURCE: Banco de España. 
€ bn 
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Against this background, the total volume of credit granted fell for the first time in many 
years, and total assets stagnated, with nil growth, according to the individual statements, 
and -0.4% growth at the consolidated level (see Table 6.3), as against increases of 8.6% 
and 9.5%, respectively, in 2008. Only foreign operations displayed a positive rate of 
change (8.6%), partly as a result of the acquisition of new foreign institutions by a large 
Spanish one.
On the liabilities side, the granting of government guarantees and the progressive recovery of 
investor demand on the primary securities markets, along with the lower need for fresh funds 
due to the stagnation of activity, helped to reduce the pressure. Institutions were able to issue 
new medium- and long-term securities, and significantly less new funding was raised on the 
interbank market and at the central bank compared with the previous year. Net lending by the 
Eurosystem has thus stabilised at around 2% of total assets since August.
The fierce competition to attract retail deposits continued, however, pushing the average inter-
est rate on new customer operations up to levels generally above the interbank market rate for 
the same maturity, which has not prevented the overall cost of funds from falling for institu-
tions. In any event, the funds raised from households and non-financial companies in Spain 
grew by only 3%, clearly slower than in the previous year.
After-tax profit decreased by around 25% (see Table 6.3), a performance similar to that re-
corded in the previous year. Consequently, the consolidated return on equity decreased further 
to 9%, although it still compares favourably with that of other banking systems. However, look-
ing forward, there are downside risks to net interest income, relating to the tailing off – and 
possible reversal – of the positive effect on this variable of the decline in the cost of funds. 
Write-downs and provisions rose sharply again, in line with the increase in doubtful assets, 
although the rate of growth of the latter has moderated somewhat since March 2009. The 
reduction in the provisions buffer and the persistence of a scenario of weak economic growth 
for the coming quarters will mean that this component will continue to put pressure on Spanish 
credit institutions’ income statements.
Although funding on the 
securities markets has 
recovered
the strong competition to 
attract deposits...
and the rise in doubtful assets 
continues to put pressure on 
income statements
2006 2007 2008 2009
Public-debt book-entry market (a) 22,615 22,664 19,944 18,566
Spot 2,903 3,177 2,202 2,471
Repos and sell/buy-back agreements 19,385 19,193 17,477 15,945
Forward 327 294 265 150
AIAF fixed-income market 900 1,108 2,401 3,692
Commercial paper 482 555 577 529
Covered bonds and asset-backed securities 329 460 1,740 2,849
Other 90 93 83 314
Stock exchange: fixed-income 93 90 80 75
Stock exchange: equities 1,156 1,670 1,245 898
MEFF derivatives markets 934 1,451 1,073 710
Ibex 35  883 1,384 989 622
Stock options 23 27 23 43
Stock futures 28 41 61 45
 TURNOVER ON SECONDARY AND DERIVATIVES MARKETS TABLE  6.2 
SOURCES: Bolsas y Mercados Españoles, Federation of European Stock Exchanges and Banco de España. 
 
a. Only includes transactions in State securities. 
€ bn 
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As a whole, Spanish credit institutions have a solid financial position. This should have been 
further strengthened by the increase in equity and the accumulation of a significant volume 
of liquid assets (fixed-income securities) available for use in the event of financing problems. 
However, their room for manoeuvre has declined from previous years, as a consequence of 
the fall in profits and the downside risks to which they are subject. In addition, there is sig-
nificant variation across institutions in the amount of risk incurred, in the ability to generate 
profit and in the degree of solvency. This heterogeneity explains the design of the various 
measures adopted to support the banking system and, in particular, the creation of the 
FROB, an instrument that is intended to facilitate the necessary streamlining of the Spanish 
banking system, taking into account the diverse circumstances of the various institutions 
(see Box 6.1).
The net funds raised by collective investment institutions (CIIs) remained negative in 2009, but 
substantially less so than in the previous period (see Chart 6.3). Against a background of de-
clining short-term interest rates and an improving financial market outlook, the net withdrawal 
of funds from the sector was concentrated among those funds that constitute the most direct 
substitutes for deposits (money market and short-term securities funds). By contrast, insur-
... restricting credit institutions’ 
room for manoeuvre, although 
the financial position of the 
sector as a whole is solid
3.2 INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS 
The sector’s adjustment is 
slowing ...
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ance and pension funds were, as in the recent past, more stable and raised a net positive 
amount of funds, which was similar to that recorded two years previously.
Less traditional instruments – such as hedge funds, real estate funds and venture capital funds 
– generally continued to adjust more strongly. However, from mid-2009, the former recovered 
somewhat. In the case of real estate funds, the existence of significant volumes of outstanding 
redemption requests continued to weigh heavily on their performance and asset valuations 
carried on adjusting. This could complicate the possibilities for the immediate development of 
... with the most intense 
adjustment occurring among 
less traditional instruments
CONSOLIDATED INDIVIDUAL
Dec 2008 Dec 2009 Y-o-y rate (%) Dec 2008 Dec 2009 Y-o-y rate (%)
MAIN BALANCE SHEET ITEMS (% of TA)
TOTAL ASSETS (€bn) 3,713.0 3,697.2 -0.4 3,142.4 3,142.4 0.0
Credit 67.3 64.8 -4.1 63.2 61.5 -2.7
Of which: resident private sector in Spain 57.8 56.1 -3.0
Debt securities 10.5 13.5 27.7 10.3 13.2 29.1
Other capital instruments and equity interests 2.9 3.1 7.2 5.4 5.6 4.4
Other assets 19.3 18.6 -4.1 21.1 19.6 -7.1
LIABILITIES
Banco de España and other central banks 3.6 3.2 -12.1 3.7 3.6 -4.0
Interbank deposits 13.0 13.5 3.1 17.3 17.6 1.9
Customer deposits 48.9 50.1 2.1 51.1 50.5 -1.3
Of which: households and non-fin.corps. res. in Spain 28.4 29.3 3.0
Marketable securities 18.1 17.2 -5.9 11.8 12.5 6.5
Other liabilities 14.4 13.1 -9.4 14.1 13.4 -5.3
Equity 5.6 6.2 9.4 5.7 6.0 5.5
INCOME STATEMENT (% of ATA)
(+) Interest income 5.75 4.03 -22.5 4.91 3.42 -27.3
(–) Interest expense 3.93 2.09 -41.3 3.67 1.97 -43.9
Net interest income 1.82 1.94 18.2 1.25 1.45 21.6
Return on equity instruments and investees 0.23 0.14 -33.6 0.40 0.25 -35.2
(+) Net commissions 0.70 0.61 -3.7 0.46 0.41 -5.4
(+) Profits on financial operations 0.25 0.27 22.6 0.19 0.13 -30.6
(+) Other operating income (net) 0.02 0.00 -78.7 0.03 0.01 -38.3
Gross margin 3.01 2.96 8.8 2.32 2.26 1.5
(–) Operating expenses 1.37 1.28 3.3 1.04 0.98 -1.2
(–) Write-downs of and provisions for financial assets 0.84 1.03 35.8 0.68 0.91 39.3
Operating profit 0.81 0.66 -9.9 0.60 0.37 -36.6
(+) Other income (net) 0.03 -0.05 — 0.10 0.11 11.5
(–) Taxes 0.15 0.08 -43.7 0.07 0.05 -30.7
After-tax profit 0.77 0.53 -24.0 0.63 0.42 -29.8
Group net profit 0.73 0.49 -25.3
RATIOS (%)
Net interbank position/TA (a) -8.3 -8.8 -8.7 -9.4
Solvency 11.3 12.2
Doubtful assets/TA 2.2 3.1 2.1 3.1
Coverage of doubtful assets 71.3 60.7 69.5 57.6
Foreign operations/TA 22.1 24.1
Efficiency (OE/GI) 46.2 43.2 45.1 43.7
ROE 13.1 8.9 11.2 7.2
CREDIT INSTITUTIONS 
BALANCE SHEET AND INCOME STATEMENT 
TABLE 6.3 
SOURCE: Banco de España. 
 
a. Includes net assets with central banks. 
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Spanish real estate investment trusts, which are regulated by Law 11/2009 and intended to be 
a new way for investors to gain access to the returns on a diversified portfolio of rented prop-
erty. Finally, the main problem for venture capital funds continued to be the difficulty of obtain-
ing external finance, so that a significant part of their activity was sustained by public-spon-
sared funds, who are mainly active in the low-value transactions segment.
In any event, these non-traditional instruments continued to represent a minor part of a sector 
that was still characterised by a high degree of conservatism in its investment policy (see the 
lower panels of Chart 6.3). Although the relative weight of equities increased slightly – largely 
as a consequence of price revaluation – it remained low (19.2% in CIIs and 13.2% in insurance 
companies and pension funds in December 2009). Also, according to the CNMV, illiquid as-
sets (primarily fixed-income securities issued by financial institutions) represented only 8.7% of 
A conservative investment 
structure persists ...
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a. Shares and other equity in CIIs and reserves of insurance companies and pension funds. In the case of 
credit institutions, deposits and repos of households and non-financial corporations.
b. Includes cash, deposits and repos.  
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the total assets of financial CIIs at the end of last year. Notable too was the increase of €9 bn 
in the holdings of Spanish public debt by institutional investors as a whole.
The notable resilience of the profits of Spanish insurance companies, against a background of 
intense economic slowdown, appears to have been the result of this conservative structure of the 
investment portfolio. Also, the assets managed by other institutional investors recorded price re-
valuations again during 2009, following the falls observed in preceding periods (see Chart 6.3).
Household debt has slowed sharply during the last three years. The growth rate of household 
debt stood close to zero at the beginning of 2010, 20 pp down from the peak levels recorded 
in late 2006. This was the result of very modest growth in financing for house purchase and a 
slight contraction in that for consumption and other purposes (see Chart 6.1).
The moderation in household income has meant that the slowdown in debt has been trans-
lated into a limited decline in the sector’s debt ratio. The high level of this ratio limits the pos-
sibility that spending can be financed by means of further recourse to credit (see Box 6.2). 
This, along with the economy’s cyclical position, reduces the likelihood of a recovery in the 
sector’s financing in the short term.
The decline in the cost of financing has meant that, since the end of 2008, the household debt 
burden has fallen. In this context, the notable fall in household spending has caused the sec-
tor’s gross saving to reach historical highs and has led to significant increases in the sector’s 
net lending, to 5.4% of GDP in 2009 (up 5.1 pp from 2008), and saving, after the deduction of 
debt service payments (see Chart 2 of Box 6.2).
The downward path displayed by household net wealth from the second half of 2008, follow-
ing the sharp growth in the latter stages of the upturn, has slowed since mid-2009 (see Chart 
6.4). The deceleration of the decline in house prices (between June and March its year-on-
year rate of fall decreased by almost 4 pp, to 4.7%) and the increase in the value of the finan-
cial portfolio, driven by the increase in stock prices and the recovery in net investment (acqui-
... which is conducive to 
sustainable results
4 The financial flows and 
balance sheet position of 
the non-financial sector
4.1 HOUSEHOLDS
The sharp slowdown in 
household debt took its growth 
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The rate of decline in household 
wealth is moderating, thanks to 
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of financial assets ...
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a. Calculated on the basis of the estimated changes in the stock of housing, in the average area 
per housing unit and in the price per square metre. 
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BOX 6.2THE FINANCIAL POSITION OF THE NON-FINANCIAL PRIVATE SECTOR FROM A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
The financial position of households and firms is a major determinant 
of the Spanish economy’s capacity to recover, given its influence on 
expenditure decisions. This box aims to assess this position from a 
historical perspective.
The rapid growth in household borrowing during the period 1995-
2007, driven partly by the structural changes accompanying euro 
area membership, pushed the sector’s debt ratio to very high levels 
(see Panel 1). The subsequent moderation in lending brought about 
a small correction in this indicator, although it currently remains high 
in historical terms. The ratio of debt to gross disposable income (GDI) 
in the sector stood in 2009 at around 125%, 80 pp higher than in the 
mid-1990s. This steep rise was the result of considerable increases 
both in the proportion of the population servicing debts and in the 
average value of their liabilities. Since 1996, the percentage of per-
sons over 18 years old with bank loans and the average value of their 
debts in relation to the average gross wage have risen by around 20 
pp and 100 pp, respectively.1 The high level of indebtedness sug-
gests that the scope for basing a pick-up in household spending 
levels on increased borrowing is narrower than in the past. At the 
same time, households have earmarked a large portion of the debt 
incurred over recent years to financing investments, particularly in real 
estate. Consequently, despite the substantial increase in such debt, 
the net wealth of the sector also increased significantly between 1995 
and 2007, contracting somewhat thereafter on account of the fall in 
-2 
0 
2 
4 
6 
8 
10 
12 
14 
16 
18 
20 
90 92 94 96 98 00 02 04 06 08 
 DEBT BURDEN (a) 
 GROSS SAVING (c) 
 SAVING AFTER DEBT SERVICE (d) 
2 DEBT BURDEN AND SAVING: HOUSEHOLDS 
% GDI 
  
5 
10 
15 
20 
25 
30 
35 
40 
0 
100 
200 
300 
400 
500 
600 
700 
90 92 94 96 98 00 02 04 06 08 
 DEBT (a)/GOS + FR 
 INTEREST PAID/GOS + FR (right-hand scale) 
3 DEBT RATIO AND DEBT BURDEN: FIRMS 
% % 
500 
620 
740 
860 
980 
1,100 
40 
60 
80 
100 
120 
140 
90 92 94 96 98 00 02 04 06 08 
 DEBT (a) 
 NET WEALTH (right-hand scale) 
1 DEBT RATIO AND WEALTH: HOUSEHOLDS 
% GDI % GDI 
0 
200 
400 
600 
800 
1,000 
1,200 
1,400 
1,600 
REAL ESTATE CONSTRUCTION OTHER 
 SPAIN: 2000 FIGURE 
 SPAIN: 2007 FIGURE 
 EURO AREA: 2007 FIGURE 
4 DEBT RATIO: FIRMS BY SECTOR (e)  
% GOP 
SOURCES: Ministerio de Vivienda, INE and Banco de España. 
 
a. Includes bank credit and off-balance sheet securitised loans. 
b. Estimated interest payments plus debt repayments. 
c. Balance of use of disposable income account. 
d. Gross saving less estimated debt repayments. 
e. Calculated on the basis of the firms included in the BACH database. In the case of the euro area, includes firms in Germany, France, Italy 
and Portugal. Debt includes non-cost-bearing liabilities. 
1. Based on surveys of households by the European Community Household 
Panel and the Spanish Survey of Household Finances for the period 1994-
2005, the rise in the proportion of economic agents with debts has occurred 
across income brackets, but is particularly pronounced in middle-income 
households. That said, there is still a clear positive relationship between indebt-
edness and income level.
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the price of property (the main asset). The result was that in 2009 the 
wealth/GDI ratio stood at around 360 pp above its 1995 level. House-
holds are therefore wealthier and, in principle, this would allow their 
precautionary saving to be less than in the past.
As a result of the sizeable increase in household indebtedness, and 
notwithstanding the fact that it was accompanied by a reduction in 
borrowing costs and by longer repayment periods, the regular pay-
ments associated with debt repayment currently absorb a larger 
share of household income, to the detriment of the share available for 
other uses (see Panel 2). In this connection, once obligations associ-
ated with liabilities have been taken into account, in 2009 house-
holds’ ability to save stood at around mid-1990s levels, even though 
in recent quarters gross saving – i.e. prior to deducting debt repay-
ments – was 4 pp above its previous high, recorded during the reces-
sion of the early 1990s.
The volume of borrowing by firms also rose considerably between the 
late 1990s and 2007. However, unlike the case of households, less 
favourable developments in income have prevented their debt ratio 
from falling during the economic crisis. Accordingly, in relation to in-
come generated (gross operating profit – GOP – plus financial reve-
nue), these liabilities stood at close to 600% in 2009, around 315 pp 
higher than in the late 1990s (see Panel 3). This aggregate position is, 
nevertheless, consistent with a wide sectoral dispersion. More spe-
cifically, immediately before the onset of the crisis, the real estate 
services sector had some of the highest levels of borrowing. While 
this debt is partly attributable to structural differences, it is also the 
consequence of the rapid growth of these firms’ liabilities during the 
years of the real estate boom, which pushed the ratio far above the 
average level in the other euro area countries (see Panel 4). In other 
sectors, the differences between Spain and the rest of the euro area 
were not as marked in 2007 (in construction the ratio was actually 
lower), although increases were also recorded during the upturn. 
More recently, the drop in corporate earnings associated with the 
economic crisis has increased the financial burden on firms with out-
standing debts, the more so the higher their leverage.
In spite of the substantial increase in corporate sector debt, the fall in 
the cost of borrowing has meant that the share of income absorbed 
by interest payments is over 10 pp lower than in the early 1990s. 
Recent interest rates cuts have, in particular, contributed to alleviating 
the financial burden of the sector, in a context of unfavourable profit 
developments. According to the Central Balance Sheet Data Office 
Annual Survey, whereas the percentage of firms with negative GOP 
was higher in 2008 than during the 1992-1993 recession, the share 
of firms with negative ordinary net profit (the result of GOP minus 
costs incurred through capital repayments, plus financial income) and 
the share of firms with short-term financial obligations (interest plus 
short-term debt) that exceeded their income were also lower than in 
the early 1990s. The scope for the financial component to continue 
exerting a positive impact on corporate earnings is small, however, 
given the level of interest rates. Therefore, in a context of rising inter-
est rates, its contribution to developments in net earnings in the cor-
porate sector can be expected to have an unfavourable influence.
Overall, the profound transformation undergone by corporate and 
household balance sheets over the last 15 years has placed these 
sectors in a less sound financial position than in the past. The high 
level of indebtedness (in the case of firms, especially in the real estate 
sector) means that, unlike after the recession in the early 1990s, their 
capacity to base a recovery in their expenditure on an increase in their 
liabilities is now more limited. Similarly, the decline in borrowing costs 
in recent years, which has contributed to softening the impact of 
higher levels of debt on financial costs, has brought them down to 
very low levels. Consequently, households and firms are unlikely to 
obtain further reductions in their debt burdens without reducing their 
liabilities.
BOX 6.2THE FINANCIAL POSITION OF THE NON-FINANCIAL PRIVATE SECTOR FROM A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE (cont´d)
sitions less sales) in financial instruments. The latter, after the lows reached in 2008, rose by 
1.4 pp of GDP in 2009, to 4.2%. By instrument, there were notable increases in sight depos-
its and investment funds (although the latter still recorded a slight negative flow), to the detri-
ment of term deposits, which accounted for a large volume of funds in 2008, when yields 
were high.
Despite the decrease in the debt burden, the macroeconomic deterioration and, in particular, 
the rise in unemployment, the degree of financial pressure on certain segments of the sector 
has continued to increase. This has been reflected once again in increases in the doubtful as-
sets ratio (although it has slowed since mid-2009), which reached 3.7% at the end of last year, 
2.9 pp up from the beginning of 2007.
The sharp slowdown in financing raised by firms since the beginning of 2007 has brought its 
growth rate down to negative levels. At the beginning of 2010 it was around -2%, 30 pp below 
its end-2006 level.
... but the degree of financial 
pressure on households is 
increasing
4.2 FIRMS
Corporate debt is contracting...
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Behind this slowdown lies differences in behaviour by instrument, size category and sector. 
First, while credit granted by Spanish credit institutions slowed very sharply, credit from the rest 
of the world and the issuance of fixed-income securities, used basically by larger firms, were 
more dynamic. This was partly related to the better outlook for larger firms, some of which are 
expanding internationally (see left-hand panel of Chart 6.5). Similarly, there was a larger con-
traction in financing granted by resident credit institutions to SMEs (compared with that granted 
to larger companies) in sectors other than construction and real estate services. This develop-
...albeit with differences by 
instrument, sector and size 
category
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a. Includes off-balance sheet securitised credit. 
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ment was probably a consequence of the more negative behaviour of their profits and of their 
more problematic financial situation, which would have contributed to further depressing their 
demand for funds and to increasing the risks associated with lending, against a background of 
stricter control over credit institutions’ exposure. Finally, there was also significant heterogene-
ity across sectors. Credit granted to real estate services increased slightly (which could partly 
be explained by the fact that the falling rate of sale of real estate means that related financing 
has to be maintained over a longer period), while that granted to the construction and agricul-
ture sectors contracted significantly, as did that to other services (although to a lesser extent).
The strong slowdown in corporate investment led to a rapid correction in the sector’s net bor-
rowing. At the end of 2009 the latter amounted to 0.5% of GDP, 11 pp less than in 2007. The 
financing gap, which also includes permanent investment abroad, fell even more over this 
period (by almost 15 pp), in line with the significant fall in Spain’s direct investment in the rest 
of the world, to stand at the end of 2009 at 1.2% of GDP. There was also a significant decrease 
in the outstanding amount of trade credit (sharper than that recorded in the recession of the 
early 1990s), possibly owing to the fact that activity was less buoyant and to the greater reluc-
tance of firms to grant this type of financing.
The sector’s net borrowing 
declined, largely owing to the 
fall in corporate investment
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The contraction in economic activity was also reflected in corporate income. In the sample of 
firms reporting to the Central Balance Sheet Data Office Quarterly Survey (CBQ), in which large 
firms predominate, the percentage of firms recording negative ordinary net profit increased 
again in 2009. According to the information available for 2008 from the mercantile registries 
and the Central Balance Sheet Data Office, the deterioration of results was more acute among 
smaller firms, except in construction and real estate services, where the decline was more 
uniform across size categories. However, the latest CBQ data available, for 2009 Q4, would 
suggest that this deterioration in corporate income has been checked. Likewise, analysts es-
timate that the profits of listed companies will only decline slightly over the next twelve months, 
which means that the estimates of previous quarters have been revised upwards.
The unfavourable trend in income meant that, despite the contraction in the sector’s liabilities, 
the ratio of its debt to income remained on a rising trend, to reach almost 600% (see Charts 3 
and 4 of Box 6.2). Notwithstanding this, the reduction in firms’ financing costs enabled the 
associated debt burden to fall to close to 22.5% of income, down 6.9 pp from a year earlier, 
when it stood at a historic high. Looking forward, as in the case of households, it is unlikely, 
given their low level, that financing costs can continue to contribute to alleviating the financial 
pressure on the sector (see Box 6.2).
As a result of the deterioration in firms’ balance sheets, the indicators of financial pressure on invest-
ment and employment have increased significantly, to stand at around the levels observed in the previ-
ous recession, although the most recent data point to a moderation in this tendency (see Chart 6.6).
Also, the number of insolvent firms and the doubtful assets ratio have increased. The firms in 
greatest financial difficulty continue to be those in construction and real estate services, whose 
doubtful assets ratio stood in December at 9.6%, practically three times as high as that for 
other sectors (see Chart 6.1).
Expansionary fiscal policy led to a marked deterioration in public finances. The general govern-
ment budgetary position moved from a surplus of close to 2% of GDP in 2007 to a deficit of 
The contraction in economic 
activity was reflected in 
corporate income
... which has prevented the 
decline in firms’ liabilities from 
leading to a correction in their 
debt ratio ...
... and the proportion of firms 
having difficulty paying their 
debts increased 
4.3 GENERAL GOVERNMENT
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CHART 6.8 
SOURCE: Banco de España. 
 
a. Unsectorised assets and liabilities not included. 
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11.2% in 2009 (see Chart 6.7). By sub-sector the deterioration was more intense in central 
government and also, although to a lesser extent, in the regional (autonomous) governments. 
The Social Security System continued to run a surplus, albeit a smaller one than in previous 
years.
The large borrowing requirement and the increase in asset holdings were basically covered 
through the issuance of securities, at short and especially medium and long maturities. The 
funds raised by this type of instrument amounted to almost 90% of total funds obtained and, 
in net terms, were equivalent to 3.2% and 9.4% of GDP, in the case of short-term and medium 
and long-term securities, respectively, a much larger volume than in preceding years. On the 
assets side deposits increased, partly reflecting the transfers made to the FROB, while the 
acquisition of securities fell.
The rapid growth of public debt, which increased by more than 45% in two years, along with 
the decline in GDP, translated into a notable increase in the debt-to-GDP ratio, which rose by 
13.5 pp in 2009, to 53%, 18 pp above the low level reached in 2008 Q1. The issuance of fixed-
... which was largely financed 
through the issuance of fixed-
income securities
The sector’s debt exceeded 
50% of GDP, up 17 pp from 
2006
2006 2007 2008 2009
NET FINANCIAL TRANSACTIONS -8.4 -9.6 -9.1 -4.7
FINANCIAL TRANSACTIONS (ASSETS) 18.1 14.8 2.5 1.0
Gold and SDRs 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Cash and deposits 5.2 2.1 -0.3 -1.8
Of which:
Interbank (a) 3.4 4.2 -0.5 -1.7
Securities other than shares -1.2 1.6 1.3 0.0
Of which:
Credit institutions -2.0 1.8 1.6 1.3
Institutional investors 0.7 0.0 -1.3 -0.5
Shares and other equity 10.8 8.8 1.9 1.5
Of which:
Non-financial corporations 8.3 6.6 3.1 0.0
Institutional investors 1.2 -1.1 -1.6 0.3
Loans 2.1 1.2 0.8 0.7
FINANCIAL TRANSACTIONS (LIABILITIES) 26.5 24.3 11.6 5.7
Deposits 0.3 7.3 9.0 0.9
Of which:
Interbank (a) 0.6 6.7 6.2 0.7
Securities other than shares 21.3 8.1 -2.6 3.8
Of which:
General government 1.0 -1.3 1.2 5.1
Credit institutions 8.0 3.6 -1.9 1.1
Other non-monetary financial institutions 12.3 5.8 -1.9 -2.4
Shares and other equity 0.5 4.6 3.3 0.9
Of which:
Non-financial corporations 0.1 4.7 2.4 0.1
Loans 3.5 3.1 2.7 1.0
Other, net (b) -0.4 0.3 0.4 -1.5
MEMORANDUM ITEMS:
Spanish direct investment abroad 8.4 9.5 4.7 1.1
Foreign direct investment in Spain 2.5 4.5 4.6 1.0
FINANCIAL TRANSACTIONS OF THE NATION  
Cumulative four-quarter data 
TABLE 6.4 
SOURCE: Banco de España. 
 
a. These correspond to credit institutions only, and include repos. 
b. Includes, along with other items, the asset-side caption showing insurance technical reserves and the net flow of trade credit. 
% GDP 
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income securities by general government has moderated in the first few months of 2010, al-
though the rate remains high.
The decline in average financing costs mitigated the impact of the substantial increase in pub-
lic debt on interest payments. The latter increased by 10%, year-on-year, to represent 1.8% of 
GDP, only 0.2 pp more than in 2008.
In 2009 there was a notable reduction in the net borrowing of the nation as a whole, to 4.7% 
of GDP, in cumulative 12-month terms, well below the levels of close to 9% of GDP observed 
between 2006 and 2008 (see Chart 6.8). This improvement was a result of the recovery in 
households’ net lending and the lower net borrowing of firms (reflecting their severely re-
strained spending plans), which more than offset the rise in the general government deficit 
(and the lower saving by financial institutions) (see Chapter 5).
Capital inflows maintained the trend decline displayed since the beginning of the crisis, falling 
to 5.7% of GDP, approximately half their level in 2008 (see Table 6.4). Also, there were notable 
changes in their composition. The bulk of financing was channelled through general govern-
ment debt issues, which represented more than 5% of GDP. The net funds raised through the 
fixed-income securities of credit institutions amounted to 1% of GDP, as compared with -1.9% 
the previous year, reflecting a certain improvement in wholesale financing markets and the fact 
that issues of guaranteed securities were well received. By contrast, the net position in the 
interbank market fell to 2.4% of GDP, from 6.7% the previous year. The inflows arising from the 
acquisition of shares and other equity by non-residents also declined, to around 1% of GDP, 
in line with the fall in foreign direct investment in Spain, which also stood at 1% of GDP.
Following sharp falls in the preceding two years, capital outflows decreased slightly (by 1 pp), 
to 1% of GDP. This decline affected both fixed-income securities and equity. In particular, the 
acquisition of equity by non-financial corporations fell, to practically zero, from 3.1% of GDP in 
2008. In line with this development, Spanish direct investment abroad contracted to 1.1% of 
GDP, extending the downward trend from the level of 9.5% reached in 2007.
As a consequence of the investment flows and changes in asset prices, the nation’s net liabil-
ities at the end of 2009 represented somewhat more than 90% of its GDP, which is more than 
10 pp higher than in the preceding year. Somewhat more than 7 pp of this increase corre-
spond to the rise in the net amount of public debt held by the rest of the world (see Chart 
6.8)1
However, the impact on the 
debt burden was reduced by 
the decline in financing costs
5 External investment 
and financing of the 
Spanish economy 
The nation’s net borrowing fell
Capital inflows were mainly 
channelled through instruments 
issued by general government
The negative balance of the 
international investment position 
increased
1. For further details see the publication The Spanish Balance of Payments and International Investment Position.
